Local politicians and multilevel connections: elected brokers in Brazilian federalism
Abstract
In this study, we assess the brokerage relationship between Brazilian local politicians (mayors and city councilors) and federal and state deputies: what are the specificities of the local politicians’ activities and the underlying mechanisms of these relationships? E mploying a multi-method approach, we integrate quantitative data from four waves of surveys with federal and state deputies, with new qualitative data from interviews with city councilors and aides of state deputies. Our findings show that local politicians are potential mediators, especially due to their upward connections, informational asymmetry in their favor (more pronounced for city councilors), and local prominence (mayors). These connections do not come solely from partisanship, and result in a positive-sum game, where delegation risks are lower than expected, even under many uncertainties.
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Funding data
-
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Grant numbers 309865/2021-2;404486/2023-1 -
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo
Grant numbers 2023/04854-6
